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Abstract
Many scholars have detected a decrease of political violence, but the causes of this
decline remain unclear. As a contribution to this debate, we revisit the controversy over
trends in conflict after the end of the Cold War. While many made ominous predictions of
surging ethnic warfare, Gurr presented evidence of a pacifying trend since the mid-1990s
and predicted a further decline in ethnic conflict in an article on ‘the waning of ethnic war.’
Leveraging more recent data on ethnic groups and their participation in ethnic civil wars,
this study evaluates if Gurr was right about the decline of ethnic conflict, and if he was
right for the right reasons. We assess whether an increase in governments’ accommodative
policies toward ethnic groups can plausibly account for a decline in ethnic civil war. Our
findings lend considerable support to an account of the pacifying trend that stresses the
granting of group rights, regional autonomy and inclusion in power sharing, as well as
democratization and peacekeeping.
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Although current violent conflicts such as Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, South Sudan, and Yemen
dominate headlines, conflict researchers argue that armed conflict has declined in recent years.
Pinker and Mack (2014) note that the media by definition is biased and will give more atten-
tion to violent events than peace or ‘things that don’t happen,’ and emphasize that ‘[t]he only
sound way to appraise the state of the world is to count.’ In a magisterial survey, Pinker (2011)
argues that the current trend is part of a pacification process” with long historical roots, while
Goldstein (2011) attributes the more recent global decline in armed conflict to the influence of
peacekeeping and other more indirect interventions by international organizations. Although
some have questioned the finding itself — either through challenging parts of the decline-of-
violence thesis or arguing that a decline of some types of violence hides an increase in other
types of violence (e.g., Braumoeller, 2013; Harrison & Wolf, 2012; Fazal, 2014; Gray, 2015;
Kaldor, 2013; Thayer, 2013; Levy & Thompson, 2013) — the empirical claim has generally
held up well and started to acquire the status of an established fact (e.g., Gat, 2013; Gleditsch &
Pickering, 2014; Pinker, 2015; Vayrynen, 2013).
What is less clear is what particular mechanisms are driving the decline. Sweeping claims
about macro trends leading to a general decline of political violence have been more prominent
than efforts to trace specific causal mechanisms. We focus on ethnic civil wars as a particu-
larly important subclass of political violence. They remain an important international security
concern, as many international crises have at least in part emerged out of ethnic civil wars, as
illustrated by World War I, and more recent fears of international escalation over the conflict in
Eastern Ukraine.
This study revisits the debate on ethnic conflict immediately after the Cold War. Several
scholars argued that the events in the former Yugoslavia augured a ‘coming anarchy’ that would
engulf the world (Kaplan, 1994; Walzer, 1992). Responding to these ‘doomsday’ scenarios,
Gurr (2000a) observed that the frequency of ethnic conflict had actually declined considerably
since the mid-1990s and predicted that this trend was likely to continue. He postulated that
a new regime of accommodation and compromise would help prevent new conflicts and end
ongoing ones. With the benefit of more than a decade of new data on ethnic civil wars and
accommodation, we are now in a position to evaluate whether Gurr was right and for the right
reasons. We use group-level data on ethnic groups’ power access from the mid-1990s, data on
changes in political institutions, as well as data on peacekeeping operations. To anticipate, we
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find ample support that Gurr was right both about the decline of ethnic civil war and that reduced
conflict seems to follow accommodation and compromise.
Literature review
Even though much of the conflict research on civil war had seen the rivalry between the super-
powers as a key source fueling conflicts (see, e.g., Buzan, 1991), the initial enthusiasm over the
end of the Cold War quickly gave way to a new pessimism (see, e.g., Mearsheimer, 1990a,b;
Mueller, 1994). Many argued that the stable and largely peaceful world of nuclear deterrence
under the superpowers was being replaced by a new and more dangerous world with increasing
ethnic warfare.
One of the most prominent contributions, Kaplan (1994, 45), warned of a coming anarchy
where we would see ‘the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional
domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.’ While Kaplan
stressed environmental scarcity, others gave cultural and ethno-religious factors a much more
prominent role in promoting conflict. For example, Huntington (1993, 71) argued that ‘conflicts
among nations and ethnic groups are escalating’ as cultural lines rose to prominence after the
Cold War. In his 1993 inaugural address, President Bill Clinton noted that ‘the new world
is more free but less stable. Communism’s collapse has called forth old animosities and new
dangers.’1
Indeed, the premise that wars were becoming more common was so widely accepted that
few even bothered to consider any empirical evidence. Perhaps the first study to detect a possible
declining trend was Wallensteen & Sollenberg (1995). However, this assessment was limited to
an analysis of a six year period 1989-1994, and primarily discussed whether there was a trend
rather than the possible causes. The article received relatively limited attention, and the authors
themselves appeared to downplay the significance of the finding by choosing to emphasize how
it was premature to dismiss interstate war as obsolescent in a follow-up article published the
subsequent year (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 1996). An op-ed piece on a decline in warfare in
the Los Angeles Times by Wilson & Gurr (1999) received more attention.2 Drawing on prior
work on conflict-reducing accommodation (Gurr, 1993), Gurr (2000a) proposed explanations
1See http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46366.
2According to Andrew Mack (personal communication), this op-ed piece eventually reached the desk of then
General Secretary of the United Nations, Kofi Annan.
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for the declining frequency of ethnic conflict. Based on an analysis of the Minorities at Risk
Data, Gurr noted that over the 1990s, the absolute number of active violent conflicts had fallen
from the peak level, and a much larger number of conflicts had deescalated rather than escalated
in severity. Moreover, wars of self-determination were increasingly solved by peace agree-
ments. Gurr (2000a, 52) pointed to a new regime of accommodation, ‘where threats to divide a
country should be managed by the devolution of state power and that communal fighting about
access to the state’s power and resources should be restrained by recognizing group rights and
sharing power.’ Gurr (2000a) furthermore noted that ‘[t]he decline in new protest movements
foreshadows a continued decline in armed conflict.’
According to Gurr (2000a, 55), the decline of ethnic war was not the result of ‘an invisible
hand,’ but reflected concerted efforts to curb and prevent conflict by individuals, groups, and or-
ganizations. Gurr argued that governments had become more willing to protect minority rights,
manifested in a decrease of active discrimination, an increase in political autonomy, and greater
accommodation of groups through power sharing. Governments had come to the realization
that conflicts over self-determination were costly and thus best solved through negotiations and
efforts to reach agreements to prevent violence. While many of these changes were linked to
democratization, Gurr noted that even autocratic states had made efforts to accommodate mi-
nority groups. Although antagonists often find it difficult to settle conflicts by themselves, the
scope for assistance and engagement from international organizations expanded with the end of
the Cold War (see, e.g. Doyle & Sambanis, 2006).
Much of the subsequent research on civil war rejected the relevance of ethnicity and grievances
for civil war, instead highlighting civil war as fundamentally a problem of weak states and rent-
seeking activities (see, e.g., Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). However, a new
wave of research has challenged the alleged irrelevance of ethnicity and grievances (see, e.g.,
Regan & Norton, 2005; Petersen, 2011; Cederman & Girardin, 2007; Cederman, Gleditsch &
Buhaug, 2013). We extend this line of research to derive testable propositions based on Gurr’s
projections relating changes in accommodation and decreasing exclusion to the decline of civil
war.
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Trends in ethnic civil war and accommodation since the mid-1990s
In order for Gurr to be right for the right reasons there would (1) have to be a decline in ethnic
civil wars since the mid-1990s, (2) evidence of an emerging regime of ethnic accommodation
and decreasing discrimination, and (3) we would need to have evidence that the latter trend is
associated with the first.
We first consider whether internal conflict along ethnic lines actually has declined since the
mid-1990s, since other studies find that the decline of conflict is not uniform for all types of
conflict and regions. For example, Gleditsch (2008, 702) notes that civil wars involving Muslim
countries and/or Islamic opposition movements have remained relatively constant since the end
of the Cold War. We use a conflict coding based on the ACD2EPR data, which map each rebel
organization in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (Gleditsch
et al., 2002) to the corresponding ethnic group in the Ethic Power Relations (EPR) data, if the
rebel organization expresses an aim to support the ethnic group and group members participate
in combat (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). For convenience, we use the term ethnic civil war for
all ethnic civil conflicts in the ACD dataset, which relies on a lower limit of 25 battle deaths.
There is little evidence for a clear distinct trend in the ethnic civil wars relative to other civil
wars. The incidence of ethnic civil war declines at a somewhat slower rate after the end of the
Cold War, possibly reflecting that ethnic conflicts are more difficult to settle than non-ethnic
conflicts. However, looking at the aggregate or country level does not allow us to examine
conflict trends relative to group characteristics. We instead turn to the group level, and examine
conflict incidence, onset and termination:
We use group-level data on ethnic groups from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR)
version 2014 (Vogt et al., 2015). Figure 1 displays the number of ethnic groups in conflict from
1946 through 2013. There is an increase in ethnic civil war until the mid-1990s, but conflict
incidence has been declining since this juncture, which is precisely the turning point that Gurr
(2000a) pinpointed (here indicated by the blue vertical line).3
We further decompose conflict incidence by assessing the number of conflict onset per year
(Figure 2), as well as the rate by which ongoing conflicts terminate (Figure 3). Figure 2 is also
3We acknowledge that the incidence of ethnic conflict prior to decolonialization may be underestimated in so far
as most colonial conflicts could be deemed to involve an ethnic element. However, the lack of precise information on
the political status and conflict participation by ethnic groups in colonies prevent us from a more systematic analysis
of these conflicts at the group level.
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Figure 1. Incidence of ethnic civil war
consistent with Gurr’s prediction of a decline in ethnic conflict onsets since the end of the Cold
War, despite a short-lived spike in 2011 reflecting several ethnic groups in the south of Sudan.
The rate at which groups in conflict terminated fighting in Figure 3 is less straightforward, in part
due to declining number of ongoing conflict and thus fewer opportunities for termination. Until
the 1980s, many years saw no groups terminating fighting at all, while the rate of termination
has been more or less consistently high since the 1990s, broadly in line with Gurr’s conjectures.
The observation that ethnic civil war has been less prevalent is also consistent with a change-
point analysis. In the online appendix we detail a Bayesian changepoint analysis (Park, 2010)
on simple trend models for the incidence, onset and termination of ethnic civil war. All three
models estimate ‘structural breaks’ that indicate a decrease in the rate of conflict to occur around
the mid/late 1990s, again bolstering Gurr’s conjectures.
Having shown that ethnic civil wars have declined since the mid-1990s, we now turn to
trends of accommodation along five dimensions: (1) ethnic discrimination, (2) territorial au-
tonomy, (3) power-sharing regimes, (4) democratization, and (5) peacekeeping operations. We
evaluate the first three using the EPR dataset, which provides a coding on whether the group
in question rules alone (i.e., either monopoly or dominance), shares power, or is excluded from
executive power. The EPR data also indicate if a group enjoys regional autonomy through ex-
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Figure 2. Onset of ethnic civil war
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Figure 3. Termination of ethnic civil war
ecutive organs at the regional level with de facto rather than merely de jure powers. These
conditions usually apply in federations, but also include where individual groups have auton-
omy, such as the Kurds in contemporary Iraq, or self-exclusion such as the Abkhazians declaring
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Figure 4. Trends in accommodation and ethnic groups’ power access
independence from Georgia. Figure 4 shows changes in the power status of ethnic groups over
time, depicting mean shares of population across countries. The world has clearly become more
inclusive since the 1970s, with the average share of excluded population sinking steadily.4 Dis-
crimination has also declined, while power sharing has increased dramatically over the entire
post-WWII period.5
Figure 5 displays trends in democratization based on the Polity IV data, classifying countries
with a score of 6 and above as democracies. This confirms a steady increase in the share of
democratic countries, especially since the end of the Cold War. Figure 6 displays the evolution of
peace keeping operations over time, using Beardsley’s (2011a) approach to extract missions with
military deployment by the UN, a regional security organization or a coalition of states.6 This
indicates a qualitative shift in the number of peacekeeping missions around the end of the Cold
War, when the reduced tensions between the superpowers expanded the room for peacekeeping
in civil wars.7
4From 1994 through 2014, mean share of excluded population sank from 0.174 to 0.132, a decline that is signifi-
cant at the p = 0.04 level.
5This figure does not depict political exclusion and discrimination due to colonialism since the EPR dataset only
covers sovereign units. If these cases were considered, however, the trend toward inclusion would have been even
stronger.
6We exclude interventions without the consent of the host countries and collective security actions with offensive
aims such as the US-led UN force in the Korean War.
7While the number of operations has not changed much since 1996, the budgets have increased substantially in
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Figure 5. Trends in democracy
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Figure 6. Trends in peacekeeping
recent years (Hegre, Hultman & Nyga˚rd, 2015).
9
Is increasing accommodation linked to the decline of ethnic civil war?
On the whole, the empirical record vindicates Gurr’s claims about an increase in ethnic and po-
litical accommodation. Indeed, the trends that were already visible a decade after the end of the
Cold War remain intact and have possibly been even stronger. This section addresses whether
the increasing accommodation plausibly caused the decline of ethnic civil war. We unpack the
aggregate trends and evaluate ethnic power access and conflict outcomes for individual ethnic
groups. If Gurr’s expectations are correct, groups that were granted improved power access or
group rights should be less likely to experience violence than those who were not, and democ-
ratization and peacekeeping should exert a further influence. We test the following hypotheses
for the onset (a) and termination (b) of ethnic civil war the period from 1994 through 2013:
H1a,b. Improved group rights through reduced discrimination caused a decline of ethnic
civil war.
H2a,b. Granting of territorial autonomy to previously powerless groups caused a decline
of ethnic civil war.
H3a,b. Inclusion in power-sharing regimes of previously excluded groups caused a de-
cline of ethnic civil war.
H4a,b. Democratization caused a decline of ethnic civil war.
H5b. Peacekeeping operations caused a decline of ethnic civil war.
These mechanisms could operate through either a decline in the probability of a conflict
outbreak or an increased likelihood that conflicts will terminate. For peacekeeping, however, we
do not expect to see any effects on conflict outbreak, since peacekeeping almost by definition is
deployed to ongoing conflict to facilitate conflict termination.8
Our research design attempts to approximate counterfactual principles in that it identifies
accommodative changes as treatments and restricts the sample to those groups that can enjoy
such treatments, rather than comparing levels of accommodation across groups based on the
full sample. This approach elucidates the consequences of increasing accommodation, which is
8Peacekeeping may prevent regional conflict spillovers to other countries (Beardsley, Cunningham & White,
2015), but the only ‘proactive’ mission in a country deemed to have a high risk of conflict outbreak so far is the
United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the Republic of Macedonia.
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precisely the gist of Gurr’s reasoning. However, it should be noted that our analysis is of course
quasi-experimental rather than strictly counterfactual since it rests on estimation without a truly
randomized, experimental treatment, with all the limitations that this entails.
In keeping with this logic, we test our hypotheses with dummy variables for all group years
following the accommodative event, while discarding from the treatment any years characterized
by reversals and limiting the scope to the period after 1993 until and including 2013. To be
precise, H1a and H1b are tested with a dummy variable that captures the granting of basic
group rights by referring to group years following an upgrade from discriminated status. We
consider all years following such changes if they occurred after 1993 and the group did not
suffer discrimination again, which implies that all discrimination-free years following the first
upgrade are considered as treatment.9
Following the same principles, our operationalization of H2a and H2b focuses on those
groups that were previously completely excluded, but were subsequently granted regional au-
tonomy after 1993. Here the treatment concerns upgrades to autonomous status rather than the
granting of group rights. Analogously, we test H3a and H3b by restricting the sample to all
excluded groups and those that were included after 1993, considering the latter groups as the
treatment category. Furthermore, using a country-level measure of democracy, we evaluate H4a
and H4b based on a democratization indicator that denotes cases where groups were residing in
a country that underwent a transition to full democracy since 1993. In line with the previous
change indicators, this one considers only the democratic years as the treatment following the
initial democratization, thus dropping any reversals to authoritarian rule from the treatment cat-
egory. Finally, in the case of peacekeeping (H5b), we rely on the country-level variable that we
introduced in the previous section. Here the variable indicates if peacekeeping was implemented
anywhere in the country.
In addition, we introduce a number of variables to control for important group-level and
country-level properties:
• Relative group size based on the demographic estimates of EPR.10
9All treatment years, which are not necessarily consecutive, are coded as one, and all other years are kept at zero.
This means that we do not consider at all those cases that already enjoyed group rights in 1993 since these groups
were already ‘treated.’ For example, if a group was granted rights in 2002 until 2005 and then again after 2009, the
variable would be zero before 2002 and then one from 2002 through 2005, following by zeroes until and including
2008, and one thereafter.
10Relative group size g ∈ [0, 1) comparing the population of the group G to the population of the incumbent I is
defined as G
G+I
if the group is excluded and as G/I if the group is included.
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• Past conflict indicating whether the group has rebelled against the government since 1946
or the independence of the country.
• Logged GDP per capita and logged population size at the country level, lagged (Penn
World Table 7.0, see Heston, Summers & Aten, 2011).
• Number of years since the previous conflict for onset analysis, and number of years since
the last peace spell, both entered as cubic polynomials (Carter & Signorino, 2010).
Table I presents results for onset and Table II results for conflict termination for all politically
relevant EPR groups that can receive accommodation from 1946 through 2013. We report logit
estimates with robust country-clustered standard errors. Ongoing conflict years were dropped
from the onset analysis and peace spells from the termination analysis.
In keeping with Gurr’s projections, Table I shows that the granting of group rights dampens
the risk of conflict, although the coefficient does not quite reach significance at the level of
p = 0.05 (see Model 1a). Regional autonomy arrangements also have a negative estimated
coefficient, but the estimate is not statistically significant and we do not have clear evidence
that this affects the probability of conflict in a consistent manner (see Model 2a).11 Yet, groups
included in power sharing benefit from a lower conflict propensity, a result that is statistically
significant at the p = 0.01 level (see Model 3a). Democratization also appears to operate as
anticipated by Gurr, at a similar level of significance (see Model 4a).12
To evaluate what these results mean in practice we compare simulations for two counter-
factual scenarios: a world in which no accommodation takes place and a world in which group
rights are strengthened by means of either ending discrimination, granting regional autonomy,
inclusion or democratization. We assume that accommodation takes effect in 2004 and then
estimate the average probability of a group experiencing a conflict onset during the next ten
years. Set up this way, the difference between the predictions for the two scenarios constitutes
the long-term effect of accommodation.13
11It should be noted, however, that the current analysis does not explore the combination of territorial autonomy
and central power sharing. Cederman et al. (2015) show that autonomy has a conflict-reducing effect in combination
with power sharing.
12Since multiple groups may engage in the same conflict, there is a risk that the results might be driven by ‘double-
counting of influential cases. However, in the online appendix we show that our results are robust to a procedure that
randomly keeps just one group from such instances.
13Specifically, we draw 1,000 sets of coefficients based on the original model estimates, and calculate predicted
probabilities for each observation for the prediction period 2004 to 2013, assuming non-accommodation and accom-
modation respectively. We then calculate yearly averages, i.e., the mean predicted probability (Gelman & Hill, 2007,
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Table I. The effect of accommodation on ethnic conflict onset
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a
group rights -1.122+
(0.573)
autonomy -0.409
(0.700)
inclusion -1.362∗∗
(0.501)
democratization -1.887∗∗
(0.718)
relative group size 6.859 4.268 3.354 1.784
(4.317) (2.629) (2.255) (1.899)
relative group size2 -5.511 -3.778 -3.314 -1.388
(6.502) (4.383) (3.705) (2.743)
past wars 0.875 1.050+ 1.318∗ 1.265∗∗
(0.764) (0.627) (0.519) (0.482)
log gdp lag -0.546∗ -0.279∗ -0.307∗∗∗ -0.261∗
(0.230) (0.132) (0.089) (0.106)
log population 0.336∗ 0.262∗ 0.137 0.108
(0.157) (0.133) (0.088) (0.107)
peaceyears -0.323∗∗ -0.382∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗ -0.414∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.108) (0.083) (0.083)
Constant -2.198 -3.267+ -1.794 -1.811
(1.995) (1.935) (1.253) (1.436)
Observations 1478 5401 7565 7504
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 7. Predicted Probabilities of at least one Conflict Onset during 2004 to 2013
Figure 7 visualizes the predictions for Models 1a-4a, where the orange estimates (squares)
depict the non-accommodation scenario, the green estimates (circles) represent the accommo-
dation scenario, and the difference between the two, i.e., the predicted change, is given in blue
(diamonds). The figure demonstrates that accommodative politics is associated with consider-
ably lower levels of conflict for affected groups. Indeed, our estimates suggest that on average
groups that are no longer discriminated against are 15 percent less likely to experience conflict
during the next decade. Inclusion can reduce this probability by 20 percent, while democratiza-
tion leads to a reduction in risk by 27 percent.
In perfect symmetry to the onset models, the analysis of conflict termination relies on a de-
pendent variable that marks the ‘onset of peace’ while dropping all peace years. Table II shows
encouraging results for the link between group rights and war termination (see Model 1b). Turn-
ing to Model 2b, it is clear that autonomy has a major pacifying influence on ongoing civil wars.
Model 3b suggests that offering power sharing to rebels could have a positive influence on con-
flict termination, but this finding is only weakly significant.14 In contrast to the onset analysis,
however, democratization does not appear to be associated with a reduction in conflict at a level
406) for the relevant sample-year for a given draw, p¯t. The probability of experiencing at least one event during the
ten year period, 2004 to 2013, is given by 1 − Π2013t=2004(1 − p¯t). The expected change induced by accommodation
is then computed as the first difference between the two estimates (again for each draw).
14Yet, narrowing the focus to governmental conflict produces significantly positive results (p = 0.009, see the
Online Appendix). This is to be expected because governmental power sharing addresses the sources of conflict at
the center of government.
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that can be separated from zero (see Model 4b). Finally, Model 5b reveals that peacekeeping
operations make conflict endings more likely, a finding that is confirmed as significant at the
p = 0.055 level.15
Table II. The effect of accommodation on ethnic conflict termination
Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b
group rights 2.059∗∗
(0.638)
autonomy 2.386∗∗
(0.783)
inclusion 1.130+
(0.586)
democratization 0.448
(0.490)
peacekeeping 0.540+
(0.282)
relative group size -4.991 -2.112 -3.839+ -4.249+ -5.751∗∗
(4.433) (2.154) (2.059) (2.413) (2.121)
relative group size2 3.453 0.347 2.811 2.901 5.024∗
(4.273) (2.435) (2.057) (2.512) (2.064)
log gdp lag 0.052 -0.135 -0.025 0.044 -0.017
(0.148) (0.143) (0.105) (0.134) (0.110)
log population -0.162 -0.522∗∗ -0.341∗∗ -0.612∗∗∗ -0.466∗∗∗
(0.339) (0.171) (0.128) (0.124) (0.110)
waryears -0.084 -0.382+ -0.397∗ -0.025 -0.476∗∗∗
(0.233) (0.225) (0.160) (0.264) (0.134)
Constant 0.565 6.487∗∗ 4.103∗ 6.076∗∗ 5.497∗∗
(4.597) (2.332) (1.873) (1.946) (1.743)
Observations 197 349 493 414 571
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 8 visualizes our results in an analogous manner, depicting the mean probabilities for
a group in conflict to terminate fighting within two years following a change towards accommo-
dation in 2004. The groups that are no longer discriminated against are on average 15 percent
more likely to terminate fighting within two years, while granting regional autonomy leads to
15Restricting the dependent variable to the ending of governmental conflict produces highly significant findings
(p = 0.003), which reflects the fact that peacekeeping troops typically intervene in governmental civil wars rather
than in secessionist conflicts.
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Figure 8. Predicted Probabilities of Conflict Termination during 2004 or 2005
an increase of 25 percent. The estimates for inclusion and democratization amount to 12 and 5
percent respectively. Finally, peacekeeping raises the probability of conflict termination within
two years by 4 percent.
In general, these findings confirm Gurr’s reasoning, and more generally those studies that
argue in favor of the pacifying influence of accommodation and ethnic inclusion. For example,
powerful arguments have been made in support of power-sharing arrangements, including re-
gional autonomy (see e.g., McGarry & O’Leary, 2009) and governmental power sharing (see
e.g., Lijphart, 1977; Mattes & Savun, 2009). Because all these institutions cannot as a rule be
treated as random shocks or externally imposed factors, however, endogeneity remains a major
challenge in this literature. In the absence of an identification strategy relying on an effective
statistical instrument, the current study also does not offer a fool-proof way of circumventing
these difficulties. Yet, it seems reasonable to assume that power sharing and similar concessions
are primarily offered to groups that are potentially threatening and thus more likely to engage
in armed conflict (e.g., Wucherpfennig, Hunziker & Cederman, forthcoming; Cederman et al.,
2015). If so, then inclusive moves are actually likely to be more effective than indicated by naive
modeling on observed data. The same applies to peacekeeping operations, which are known to
have been applied in more difficult cases rather than conflicts which are easy to settle (e.g.,
Fortna & Howard, 2008; Beardsley, 2011b).
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The result showing that conflict varies with democratization is also of considerable theoret-
ical interest. While previous studies link democratization episodes to the outbreak of civil war,
these have typically focused on more limited liberalization processes leading to semi-democracy
rather than full democracy (e.g., Mansfield & Snyder, 2005; Cederman, Hug & Krebs, 2010).
In this sense, the current study is compatible with such findings, especially since incomplete
democratization is not associated with a pacifying trend.
Table III shows the possible combinations of types of accommodation (columns) and out-
comes (rows), with some suggested examples where we have seen actual conflict or perceived
high risks prior to accommodation and these changes plausibly contributed to prevent outbreaks
or settlements in ongoing conflicts. Space does not allow us to discuss these in detail here, but
we provide details on the individual cases in our supplementary appendix, substantiating the
highlighted mechanisms.
Table III. Examples of conflict-preventing and termination-promoting accommodation since the
mid-1990s
Group rights Autonomy Inclusion Democratization Peacekeeping
Onset Liberia, Nigeria Kurds in Iraq
South Africa,
Angola
Guatemala,
Ghana (•)
Termination
Tuaregs in Mali
and Niger
Northern Ireland,
Aceh Bosnia Burundi Macedonia
Predicting conflict trends
The divergent claims on the future of ethnic conflict in the 1990s could be considered as fore-
casts. Gurr formed his predictions on the basis of explicit theory that relates changes in accom-
modation and exclusion. By contrast, many of the pessimists, including Kaplan, saw conflict as
virtually inevitable and extrapolated a continuing steady rise of ethnic conflict into the future.
Treating these contrasting views as distinct conceptual models, the current analysis evaluates
their ability to generate out-of-sample predictions. Turning the clock back to the mid/late 1990s,
we focus on the information that was available to these authors at the time of writing. Restricting
the analysis to conflict incidence, we estimate two simple statistical models that seek to reflect
Gurr’s accommodative politics and the time trend predicted by the pessimists.
The accommodative politics model builds on a binary measure of ‘political inclusion’ as its
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key variable (see Models 3a and 3b). By contrast, in keeping with the doomsayers’ extrapola-
tions, the trend model includes ‘calendar year’ as the central explanatory variable. In addition,
both models include count variables for ‘peaceyears’ and ‘waryears’ to account for duration de-
pendence. In short, each model contains three independent variables, two of which are identical
across both models. We then estimate these models drawing solely on the historical data that
was observable at the time of the debate, that is, data covering the period 1946–1999.16
Combined with new data for the post Cold War period, the parameter estimates derived from
our ‘training’ dataset can be used to generate in-sample predictions for the period 1946-1999,
as well as out-of-sample predictions for the period 2000–2013. For each group-year, this yields
the predicted probability of conflict incidence. It is then possible to aggregate by summing all
group-level predicted probabilities for a given year. This transforms the group-year predicted
probabilities into a global yearly predicted count of the number of ethnic groups engaging in
conflict. This is visualized in Figure 9. Here, the in-sample predictions from the training period
are given by the dark solid line (accommodation), and the dashed line (trend), whereas the out-
of-sample predictions are depicted in green and orange, respectively. The corridors depict 95
percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 9. Out-of-sample predictions based on accommodative politics and trend
16Results for a sample 1946–1994 are virtually identical for both models (results not shown).
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The results are striking. The trend model performs better in-sample, mirroring relatively
closely the rise in ethnic civil war until the early 1990s. By contrast, the accommodation model
overpredicts conflict until the mid 1960s, while slightly underpredicting during the 1980s.17
However, this performance pattern is sharply reversed for the out-sample prediction. Whereas
the trend model vastly over-predicts the amount of ethnic civil war (orange), the theoretically
driven specification focusing on ethnic exclusion correctly actually predicts a decline that started
during the late 1990s and largely matches the empirical trend (gray barplot).18 We emphasize
that these predictions are theory-driven, thus allowing us to evaluate more closely the causal
mechanisms behind the decline in conflict. In short, Figure 9 suggests that not only was Gurr
right in anticipating a decline in frequency of ethnic civil war, but by pointing to the role of
accommodation as a driving force, he appears to have been right for the right theoretical reasons.
Conclusion
We contribute to the recent literature on the decline-of-conflict hypothesis by focusing on the
reasons for the decline of ethnic civil war. Our findings are largely compatible Gurr’s obser-
vations about ‘ethnic warfare on the wane” and stand in stark contrast to various pessimistic
projections that were made in the early post-Cold War period and continue to be made about
today’s world. Along a number of empirical dimensions, we have found that this relatively opti-
mistic perspective holds up well. Ethnic civil wars appear to have subsided after the mid-1990s,
and this decline is at least partially attributable to an increase in governments’ accommodative
policies toward ethnic groups.
Clearly, a lot more than intellectual history is at stake, as Gurr’s arguments have major im-
plications for our theoretical understanding of civil wars while offering clues about appropriate
policies. Our findings support the general literature on grievances in civil wars that includes
Gurr’s own work (e.g., Gurr, 1993, 2000b) and many others (e.g., Horowitz, 1985; Petersen,
2002; Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2013). The findings have relevance for policy in under-
lining how concessions to ethnic groups that have hitherto been generally badly treated appears
to be associated with lower levels of conflict. This differs fundamentally from the alternative
17The root mean squared error (RMSE) is 4.53 for the accomodation model vs. 7.81 for the trend model, and the
mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) is 0.27 vs. 0.77. RMSE =
√∑
(yi − yˆi)2/n. MAPE = 1n
∑ | yi−yˆi
yi
|.
Lower values indicate better predictions for both measures.
18RMSE: 13.73 vs. 5.37; MAPE: 0.51 vs. 0.16.
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body of research that sees civil war exclusively as a problem of weak states, dismissing both the
role of grievances for conflict as well as the potential for accommodation to help settle conflicts
(e.g., Fearon & Laitin, 2003, 2004). Our analysis supports the conclusion that inclusive policies,
whether based on group rights, autonomy, inclusion or democracy, constitute the safest path to
peace (see also Mack, 2002). Our confidence in these relationship and the stability of positive
trends also determine whether we should see the recent increase in conflicts in the Middle East,
most dramatically in Syria — where we have seen little accommodation so far — as an isolated
and temporary blip or a harbinger of a general reversal in the decline of conflict (Pettersson &
Wallensteen, 2015).
In principle, it is possible that other types of political violence follow opposite trends, es-
pecially if they function as substitutes. For example, it is possible that that we see a form of
transference where terrorism, riots, and one-sided violence are increasing despite reduced eth-
nic inequality.19 Existing data do not allow us to easily link specific ethnic groups to other type
of violence, but we see this as an important area for future research. Current research on these
topics, however, do not suggest strong support for clear transference. For example, the Global
Terrorism Database indicate an increase in terrorist events. However, this may reflect better cov-
erage over time and possibly a greater tendency to classify more violent events as ‘terrorism’.
More fundamentally, most attacks take place in countries undergoing civil war, and the increase
in terrorist attacks over time is largely confined to countries with civil war. This is clearly not
consistent with the claims about transference and an increase in terrorism outside civil war, al-
though we stress again that these figures are not linked specifically to ethnic groups. Moreover,
Engene (2004) documents a clear decline in ethnic terrorism in Western Europe, attributed to
greater accommodation. Valentino (2014, 100) finds a clear decrease in one-sided violence by
the government after the Cold War, although again not specifically limited to ethnic conflict, and
much of this takes place inside rather than outside civil war. More generally, any increases in
unorganized violence such as riots following organized violence is difficult to consider as trans-
ference by the same actors or organizations, and more likely to reflect fringe groups. Finally, we
have not attempted to study whether a decline in violent ethnic civil war is accompanied by an
increase in non-violent ethnic politics, but in our view such shifts should be seen as consistent
with Gurr’s arguments rather than a challenge.
19For some prominent claims about transference, see e.g., Gray (2015); Kaldor (2013)
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Furthermore, we have studied only political changes, thus ignoring changes in other dimen-
sions of inequality at the level of individuals and groups. For example, globalization increases
openness of societies, which could in turn be expected to affect development and between-group
economic inequality in either direction depending on one’s theoretical beliefs. Religious toler-
ance and freedom could also be changing systematically over the same time period.
It should also be recalled that our analysis has been limited to the period from the mid-1990s.
A more profound treatment of the decline-of-war thesis would have to consider the entire post-
WWII era as well. Preliminary analysis indicate that we get similar results if one extends the
sample to the period from 1946 (see the online appendix). Yet, it could well be that the ac-
commodation regime was less effective during the Cold War because power sharing and similar
arrangements were simply not credible in the absence of strong third-party guarantees. Indeed,
it would seem that power sharing in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the end of the Cold War would not
have endured without massive external support. It is also possible that the pacifying behavioral
norms flowing from the accommodation regime have lagged far behind their introduction.
These are important tasks for future research. For now, we conclude that there is ample evi-
dence in support of Gurr’s initial conjecture based on empirical data going back to the beginning
of the post-Cold War period. Our findings reinforce more general claims about violence made
by Pinker and Goldstein, but help go beyond sweeping claims and establish important reasons
why ethnic civil conflict has declined.
21
Replication data
The dataset and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at http://www.
prio.org/jpr/datasets.
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